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Mission Impossible: The cooking oil securitization

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Khairul Fahmi
Khairul Fahmi, Is the Co-Founder of Institute for Security and Strategic Studies (ISESS). In 1993, he graduated from the Political Science Study Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He was once a journalist for Elshinta Radio and Managing Editor at the online media lensIndonesia.com up until in 2013, then decided to fully focus on managing the research institute he Co-founded, ISESS, to this day

Luhut and cooking oil securitization 

Is it just that? Certainly not. Political steps and policies, although not always complicated, cannot be viewed as through a narrow lens. The series of explanations above have not fully answered why the choice was not to reshuffle the cabinet but to assign Luhut instead. 

Throughout human history, logistics has often been cited as the reason for war and the mastery of logistics has often a decisive factor in victory. In 1974, then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a US National Security Council report entitled “National Security Study Memorandum 200: Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests,” better known as NSSM200 or the Kissinger Report, introduced the idea of food as weapon. 

Food is one of human basic needs so it is a very crucial issue in the context of politics and security. If we look at history, Indonesia has experienced major political events sparked by national food issues. For example, in 1966, near the end of the Old Order, people had difficulty accessing food as a result of hyperinflation. This drove elements of students and Indonesian society to carry out a series of large demonstrations better known as the Three Demands of the People (Tritura). One of the demands was to lower food prices. 

Although what happens now cannot be compared to the event in 1966, we also saw thousands of students from various universities staging large demonstrations on April 11, 2022. They made six demands, one being to maintain price stability and food availability. 

This demand was sparked by the difficulties faced by the community in purchasing cooking oil due to the scarcity of supply and high prices in the domestic market. The crisis was amplified by allegations of mafia/cartel practices or sinister conspiracies and further exacerbated by the government’s missteps and failure in mitigating the situation. 

These dynamics showed that the cooking oil issue can have a very significant impact on political stability and domestic security. Food security issue can easily morph into a political issue and even a security crisis. 

According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde who are known as the Copenhagen School group of scholars, the term securitization refers to a process in which an issue is understood as a security issue. In a nutshell, securitization is a perspective in understanding or treating a developing issue as an extraordinary risk that brings a high-level threat beyond normal limits. In fact, securitization theory was invented to respond to concerns about traditional security theories which understand security as “security is what actors make of it” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 48). 

The securitization approach also opens up a wider understanding of security interrelationships such as: the attempt by a variety of actors; security providers; and interplay of various factors in the interpretation of security threats (Ciuta 2009, 309). 

According to Barry Buzan, the shift in issues, from food to security issues, can occur because security is a condition in which humans are free from all threats – including threats that interfere with humans accessing their basic needs such as the need for food. Hence, the concept of security expanded from traditional security which is of a military/ defense nature to non-traditional security, things that support quality of life. 

In practice, the securitization approach taken by the government can always be linked to efforts or policies that treat a problem that actually only requires “ordinary” handling to an issue that threatens national security and call for special action. Coercive, repressive, or unreasonable means are preferred. One example is in the eradication of terrorism and deradicalization efforts that prioritize repressive efforts but often fail to eradicate the root of the problems that give rise to terrorism. 

Thus, if a policy is implemented using a securitization approach, the government will introduce or treat an issue that should be a relatively common problem (and should need reasonable safeguards and no need for repressive or coercive measures) by making the issue a threat to people’s security and existence of the state. Under this assumption, a repressive, coercive or extraordinary security measure is the most appropriate and should be urgently taken to overcome the existing problems. 

In the context of the price spike and scarcity of cooking oil as perceived by the community, this can actually be interpreted and understood as a threat that needs to be followed up – even in ways that are out of the ordinary (securitization). In practice, securitization refers to efforts or policies to overcome a problem from “ordinary” to extraordinary measures by the government. 

To carry out securitization, it is necessary to have actors who can be symbolically portrayed to state that certain problems are matters of urgency and need to be responded with extraordinary measures so the securitization can gain public support and legitimacy. Therefore, President Jokowi’s move in assigning Luhut can actually be interpreted as an effort to define the cooking oil issue as a threat to political stability and security which necessitates extraordinary measures. 

Securitization, according to those who pioneers the approach, can be identified through engineering, particularly by linking it to a crisis or emergency through actions that would otherwise be unacceptable under normal circumstances. Conditioning this emergency or crisis allows actors to violate or breach appropriate rules. So the government or the state, for example, in an effort to solve the dire problems it is facing, can try to justify its stance in dealing with major crises or threats using a security framework. 

Interestingly, another actor of this securitization effort can be observed through the use of words, verbalizations, and policies that characterize the situation as being critical or urgent. Barry Buzan (1998, 33) noted that the construction of threats in this securitization approach through a security grammar, namely “a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out.” 

This plot will be formulated through the actions of the actors who, among others, will announce that there are specific issues or problems and indicate the level of urgency and importance. Under the emergency consideration, only securitization is the most plausible option to be taken by the actor. 

Using securitization approach, we can now explain why a precarious, urgent situation was presented before through policy failures that have caused the crisis to drag on and grow into a threat. Almost similar to the securitization of the Covid-19 pandemic, in this cooking oil crisis, the need for the availability of cooking oil at affordable prices and the narrative “The state must not succumb to mafia practices and foreign interests!” served as an important plot to seek public legitimacy for the government’s securitization efforts. 

But, why does the mission (always) have to be given to Luhut? Only God and the president know. (Khairul Fahmi)

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