This situation was seen at the ASEAN summit in Cambodia in 2012, where ASEAN member states were unable to unite their views on resolving the conflict in the South China Sea which intensified after several incidents occurred between China and the Philippines. The difficult position for ASEAN arises because of the division of opinion within the organization itself. Some member states argue that China should be involved early on in the process of formulating a Code of Conduct (CoC), as proposed by Cambodia. While other member states, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, still believe that ASEAN must first ensure alignment of internal positions before negotiating on the draft CoC with China.
This disagreement among ASEAN members resulted in a decline in ASEAN’s power as an independent entity, as well as raising doubts about its relevance as a tool to achieve the national interests of its member states. It is evident that the assumption of China’s great influence over ASEAN over the South China Sea dispute is a reality. This is in response to the efforts of the United States to interfere in ASEAN affairs through its allies, especially in the case of the Philippines. In the end, the Southeast Asian region that should be the ASEAN region actually becomes a battlefield between the PRC and the United States, even potentially for military conflict between the two that could trigger a third world war, as analyzed by some experts. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s internal divisions related to disputes in the South China Sea, even at the CoC discussion stage, can cause distrust in the vision of realizing the ASEAN Community, especially in the APSC pillar.
Similar conditions have persisted in ASEAN’s history for a long period of time. For example, at an informal ASEAN Summit in 1999, the Philippines, with support from Vietnam, proposed a draft Code of Conduct (CoC) that essentially aims to change ownership status over disputed areas, contain more detailed provisions than the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and propose joint development cooperation in the Spratly Islands. However, this draft was rejected by China. Malaysia also tried to propose a joint declaration on the Spratly Islands at the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Brunei Darussalam in 2002. Malaysia’s efforts have been fruitless as the majority of ASEAN members feel it is not yet clear whether the agreement will result in a declaration or code of conduct. Finally, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea emerged as a middle solution to Malaysia’s proposal.
On the other hand, economically, the United States is increasing competition in the Southeast Asian region with China. China’s goods and capital presence is likely to increase in the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia in particular. Although slowing somewhat, most signs suggest that China’s trade in the region, and particularly exports to China, will continue to experience substantial growth, especially as low-cost consumer goods manufacturing for the Chinese market moves to other regions of Asia, including the Southeast. Asia. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and its “one belt one road” initiative can be crucial means for China’s economic engagement in the region. With increasing trade interdependence and China’s growing investment footprint in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia, greater Chinese political and diplomatic influence is likely to follow. Beijing has to face the fact that its promised investments are often not implemented or, when implemented, fraught with problems. Over time, however, Beijing will be able to better manage the negative publicity that accompanies its investments in Southeast Asia.
In terms of security, most countries in the region have an external environment that is relatively stable and free from real threats coming from their neighbors. Security issues that are top priorities for most nations in the Indo-Pacific tend to emerge from within the limits of their sovereignty: safeguarding economic growth and socio-economic stability, countering religious extremism, and quelling restive ethnic separatism. This is especially true in Southeast Asia. This would limit the willingness and capacity of many countries in Southeast Asia to open strong military-to-military ties with the United States. What’s more, many countries in the region fear provoking China through closer military ties with Washington.
China’s growing economic, diplomatic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia, presents its own set of challenges to U.S. strategic engagement in the region. This does not mean that China has an advantage over the United States in Southeast Asia nor does it mean that China is destined to achieve regional dominance. But it is clear that China’s presence is a geopolitical fact on the ground that weighs heavily on regional countries’ calculations as they calibrate relations with the United States.
China is the number one trading partner for half of ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand – and is the main trading partner for most of the other five member states, making China ASEAN’s largest trading partner. all. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area entered into force in 2010 and the ASEAN-China agreement on increasing bilateral investment was reached in 2009. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, accumulated bilateral investment between China and ASEAN reached $150 billion in 2015.128 In addition, China helped push forward the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement involving ten ASEAN member states plus six partners that have free trade agreements with ASEAN: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
Read: State-Guided Capitalism As A Roadblock Toward Indonesia’s Green Future
China maintains an active diplomatic presence throughout the region and generally has positive political relations with most of its neighbors, including in Southeast Asia. Even as some bilateral political relations deteriorate in recent years — such as with Myanmar, Vietnam and the Philippines — those countries’ governments remain cautious to avoid open confrontation with Beijing. China is able to leverage its good relations with most ASEAN countries to guarantee a strong consensus within the organization that may conflict with China’s interests. Beijing could do the same in large ASEAN-centered groups in the region such as ARF and EAS.
China has also raised its military profile in the region through continued modernization efforts, joint military-to-military activities with regional partners, and greater investment in defense diplomacy. China’s land reclamation and construction of facilities in the South China Sea has received the greatest attention, including at Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Cuarteron Reef, and resulted in a stronger military presence, in and around the Spratly Islands in the south. part of LCS. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, if the mainland features of the Spratly islands are not included, the mainland Chinese feature closest to Mischief Reef is Hainan Island, which is 599 nautical miles (roughly 1,100 kilometers) away. China’s deployment includes airstrips, helipads, radar and communications facilities, docks, and air defense systems.
China faces many serious obstacles in seeking greater influence in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, China’s economic, diplomatic and military activity in and around Southeast Asia is likely to pose a major challenge to U.S. strategic engagement in the region. Countries in the region do not want to be dominated by a single hegemon and therefore welcome a strong and sustained US presence across its dimensions. Despite concerns about China’s rise and its long-term intentions, they have no choice but to pursue constructive relations with Beijing to the fullest extent possible. Importantly, while China’s growing power is alarming, concerns about increasing competition between the United States and China and possible conflict between the two are also worrisome — an outcome that would be disastrous for the region. Beijing is well aware of these concerns and will carefully manipulate them for the greatest benefit over time.
Sri Yaumil Habibie is a master’s student at the Defense University of the Republic of Indonesia. His research interests include defense science, national security, and maritime security issues.