ASEAN-CHINA
Indeed, the importance of maintaining close economic ties with China is critical for all countries in Southeast Asia, so this economic interdependence may be perceived more as a constant than a variable when trying to understand the countries’ relative strategic alignment options. Sometimes there are variations in how certain countries may choose short-term trade-offs, but all ASEAN countries are trying their best to keep different paths in both their security relations with the United States, as well as their economic ties.
At the same time, individually and collectively, ASEAN countries are responding to their increasing economic interdependence with China by continuing to diversify their relations with other economic powers. Even Laos, Southeast Asia’s poorest country, managed to capitalize on China’s interest in infrastructure investment to strike a bargain with the World Bank to fund a controversial hydropower megaproject. And increasing reliance on China helped push Myanmar’s isolated military regime toward reform from 2011 onwards, to diversify its strategic relationship.
Along with many bilateral trade liberalization agreements, since ACFTA came into force, ASEAN has also ratified the Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan, free trade agreements (FTAs) with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and goods trade agreements with India. The United States has so far signed FTAs with Singapore, and with ASEAN as a whole, the United States has had Trade and Investment Framework Arrangements (TIFA) in place since 2006 to boost trade and investment and promote liberalization of ASEAN rules. In late 2012, the Obama administration launched the U.S.-ASEAN Economic Engagement Expansion initiative, a new framework for economic cooperation to help lay the groundwork for ASEAN countries to prepare to join high-standard trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Understanding the importance of this suggests that China’s rise has brought significant strategic economic benefits to Southeast Asia. These considerations have put clear limits on how willing countries in the region are to antagonize China on various fronts, including by taking actions that show they are “conspiring” with outside powers to encircle China. Nonetheless, within those limits, China’s rise is proving strategically beneficial for Southeast Asia in terms of security: first, because it offers opportunities for strategic diversification and helps prevent reliance on U.S. strategic dominance in maintaining stability in the region. At the same time, China’s rise provides an important strategic rationale to draw long-term U.S. attention in Southeast Asia, thereby alleviating the region’s fear of American impermanence.
Showing Determination in the South China Sea
The historical context and discovery of ancient artifacts are often used as a basis by China to support its claims to the South China Sea. This action is usually followed by a show of force that tends to show its existence through provocative actions against other countries that also claim the territory. As seen in the policies that have been implemented from the early 1970s to the present, China has firmly asserted the symbols of its sovereignty, sometimes even showing an aggressive stance by attacking foreign ships passing through the waters of the South China Sea, in order to protect potential resources that could support its national interests.
China claims that islands and territories in the South China Sea have been discovered since the time of the Han Dynasty in the 2nd century BC, and by the 12th century BC, the area had been incorporated into the domain of the South China Sea by the Yuan Dynasty. The affirmation of the boundaries of this region is seen in maps developed during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, around the 13th century BC. In the 19th and 20th centuries, China asserted that the Spratly Islands were part of the Nansha Islands, about 1,100 km from Yu Lin port on Hainan Island. The Paracel Islands, located north of the Spratly Islands about 277.8 km from Hainan Island, are considered part of the Xisha Islands which are part of Hainan province (Junef, 2018 in (Matondang et al.,2022)). In 1930, the French began occupying one of the Spratly islands and in 1931, they sent a letter to the Chinese Embassy in Paris, claiming Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands prompting protests from the People’s Republic of China. Despite these protests, France retained control of the Spratly Islands, including seven others, and declared them part of the kingdom of Vietnam from 1933 to 1939.
Japan replaced France in occupying the Spratly Islands from 1939 to 1945. After Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, France re-occupied the islands in 1946. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) issued a protest against France’s actions and a month later, sent senior officials on warships to occupy the Spratly Islands. In 1947, China declared the islands part of Guangdong province and issued a map of the South China Sea with nine dashed lines forming the letter U, signifying China’s territorial claims within the red line. Since 1976, China has occupied several islands in the Paracel Islands and in 1992, Chinese law reaffirmed that claim.
Since 2010, this claim has been ongoing and based on arguments about traditional fishing zones. China’s unilateral claims to the Natuna region have continued, stoking tensions between Indonesia and China in 2013 and reaching a peak in 2016. In March, May, and June 2016, Chinese fishing vessels entered Indonesia’s EEZ and carried out a number of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Fishing) activities (Seran et al., 2023). Similar incidents occurred again in 2019 and 2020, involving not only fishing boats, but also the Chinese coast guard. The problem of violations occurred due to differences in views between China and Indonesia. The Chinese government argues that fishing boats have the right to sail and claims their coast guard patrol area is within the nine-dash line area. Meanwhile, the Indonesian government does not recognize this line nine and sees China’s actions as a violation of Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), especially in the waters of the North Natuna Sea. But again, the nine-dash line is not legally recognized in maritime law. A July 2016 arbitral tribunal decision concluded that China’s claim to historic rights on the nine-dash line was invalid (Singh, 2023), which later changed to the ten-dash line (Tanamal & Loasana, 2023).
ASEAN-US and China Triangle Model
Empirically, conflicts in the South China Sea are also influenced by factors outside the region, such as tensions between the US and China on various issues. In some studies, ASEAN’s role tends to take a cautious stance by using various organizational mechanisms, such as the ASEAN+3 cooperation framework, to reduce potential incompatibilities with China’s policies. It is important to note that, although China strongly considers the region crucial in efforts to build a multipolar structure and limit the influence of the United States in the Southeast and East Asian regions, it seems to prefer a compromising approach rather than initiating open conflict, despite having the ability and options to do so (Chalid et al., 2016).
Through ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention, in this case China, which is very firm regarding its sovereignty, feels more comfortable in dialogue on sensitive issues such as the SCS For ASEAN, this Chinese stance can be interpreted positively or negatively. China’s openness to ASEAN mechanisms provides an advantage in managing tensions in the region. Nonetheless, it is important to always maintain vigilance against China, which has always viewed itself as a greater power than ASEAN.
In addition, some ASEAN member states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, tend to support the US, while Myanmar and Cambodia tend to support China, which then adds a level of complexity to regional security issues in the region. Furthermore, Malaysia as a country involved in the dispute is also part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) coalition. This is as emphasized (Itasari & Sudika Mangku, 2020) that Southeast Asian countries that are generally considered to have lower influence have several choices. First, they can seek an alliance with China to prevent conflict, or second, they can strengthen themselves by forming common regional ties to maintain balance against China. With such a high level of diversity, ASEAN is considered to still face challenges in handling the SCS problem, which until now has not produced an agreement that is acceptable to all parties involved.
The presence of one of the major powers in the South China Sea, namely the United States, is believed to arise due to concerns over China’s increasing influence accompanied by decisive action in the South China Sea, as well as diplomatic efforts aimed at several ASEAN member states such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Therefore, it is not surprising that the United States is again intensifying cooperation with its allies in the Southeast Asian region, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore, to reduce China’s influence. The competition for influence between these two great powers has posed a dilemma for ASEAN as a regional organization in the Southeast Asian region, as there are divisions among its members, with some countries more supportive of Beijing, while others are more inclined to support Washington (Chalid et al.,2016).