This dependency is not just an imaginary fear, because Starlink has already taken advantage of a country’s dependency to extract benefits for the company. On February 28, 2022, Starlink provided free internet access to the Ukraine government. However, on September 30, 2022 it stopped its service, an act which could seriously threaten the lives of Ukrainian soldiers who are fighting on the battlefield, because it is also used by Ukrainian military in its communications.
Another potential threat to cyber-sovereignty is unwanted access where foreign countries or hostile entities can try to access satellite infrastructure for sinister purposes, such as spying or cyberattacks. This may happen because satellite-based internet services can be used to transmit sensitive data relating to national security, such as military communications and intelligence information; therefore, protecting this data from unauthorized access or hacking is critical. Cyber-security threats to satellite infrastructure can pose a serious problem. A successful cyberattack could impact satellite operations, damage or shut down satellites, steal critical information and disrupt or even cripple communications.
Relying on communications services provided by foreign companies means that a state does not have full control and oversight over the infrastructure and its operation. This means that a country cannot take necessary action, such as stopping or diverting services, if an emergency situation or threat to national security arises. This is very important, because satellite networks are also often used as a means of emergency communications during natural disasters or other emergencies. If this access is disrupted, it could impact the country’s ability to respond quickly and address an unfolding crisis or its aftermath. In addition, foreign companies such as Starlink that operate satellite infrastructure can gain control over users’ personal information that passes through their networks. This could be misused or accessed by unauthorized parties. This was evident when Starlink helped overthrow the Iranian government, by restricting internet connections, including blocking access to a number of social media.
The use of Inter-Satellite Link (ISL) technology as a communications backhaul between satellites also poses another potential threat, because Starlink does not need to build an earth station in Indonesia. As a result, the Government cannot implement internet-related control: censorship is impractical and law enforcement agencies cannot carry out legal intercept to collect information in the interests of national security or for law enforcement purposes. In addition, Starlink is designed to provide global internet services, and can be used by parties from various countries, as well as creating a situation where it may not be subject to national regulation. This can make it difficult for a government to conduct supervision and exercise control. Of course, it would be different if Starlink is willing to build a ground station in Indonesia, one that also serves as a gateway.
The use of Starlink also poses a threat to Indonesia’s sovereignty, because it is feared that its satellites could be used as a tool for espionage by the United States government/military, as hypothesized by Ren Yuanzheng and Jin Sheng in Chinese journal Modern Defense Technology titled “The Development Status of Starlink and Its Countermeasures”. This is also backed by Section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which requires US electronic communications service providers, including Starlink and its subsidiaries, to provide this intelligence information. Although Starlink claims to be a civilian program providing speedy internet service, it has a strong military background, as evidenced by the fact that several launch sites were built within Vandenberg Air Force Base and the encrypted interconnections between the satellites. US Air Force fighter jets have also been used in their technical verification tests.
In fact, Starlink has collaborated with the American military many times. In 2019, SpaceX received funding from the US Air Force to test how well Starlink satellites could connect with encrypted military aircraft. In May 2020, the US Army signed an agreement with SpaceX regarding the use of Starlink broadband to transmit data over military networks. In October the same year, SpaceX secured a US$150 million contract to develop satellites for military use. In March 2021, they announced plans to work with the US Air Force, to further test Starlink internet service. When completed, Starlink satellites can be fitted with reconnaissance, navigation and meteorological devices to further enhance the US military’s combat capabilities in areas such as remote sensing, communications relay, navigation and positioning, attack and collision, and space protection.
Strategic countermeasures
Given a raft of potential cybersecurity threats that could undermine the sovereignty of Indonesia, the Government needs to take strategic steps to mitigate them. Strategic steps that can be taken include continuing to build telecommunications infrastructure with existing technology, such as a Base Transceiver Station (BTS) with fiber optics as its backbone, to reduce technological dependence. If there are areas that cannot be reached by BTS and fiber optic networks, to the greatest extent possible use satellites owned by Indonesia, such as Indostar 2, Merah Putih, Telkom 3S, Nusantara Satu, BRISat and the newly-launched Satria 1. Starlink may be used, but only for home internet access, not for connections that have high urgency and longterm in nature, such as a communications network for border guard posts, medical needs in underdeveloped regions, or search and rescue (SAR), so that if Starlink service is stopped during emergency situations, no lives would be harmed and national security would not be compromised.
To protect against espionage activities carried out through Starlink satellites, the Indonesian government needs to develop an encryption-based communication device to be used by military, intelligence and government agencies to ensure that data transmitted via Starlink cannot be intercepted. The Government also needs to limit access to Starlink’s infrastructure to only personnel who need it. This includes setting access permissions, implementing dual authentication and closely monitoring user activity. The Government also needs to use a strong monitoring and intrusion detection system in military, intelligence and government agencies that use Starlink services, to detect suspicious activity or potential cyber-attacks.