These sanctions, however extensive in its scope, are executed purely on the basis of Myanmar’s gross violation of democratic norms. In no way are these sanctions implemented to give direct support towards ASEAN’s push for the implementation of 5-point consensus in Myanmar. Washington and Brussels did not intent for their targeted sanctions designed specifically to pressure Myanmar towards conforming to the 5-point consensus. This is not surprising given that both U.S and EU perceive ASEAN’s push for the implementation of 5-point consensus in Myanmar as an engagement of undemocratic regimes and therefore had no political appetite to be associated with it.
All this while, ASEAN constrained by its institutional norms and traditions, can only utilize non-coercive means to push for the implementation of the 5-point consensus in Myanmar. If ASEAN can convince both U.S and EU into re-designing existing and prospective sanctions in a manner that puts coercive pressure on the Burmese junta towards conformity to the 5-point consensus, ASEAN’s push for the implementation of 5-point consensus in Myanmar will certainly gain significant strength.
But how can ASEAN achieve this? During the 1997 Cambodia coup, the Friends of Cambodia (FOC) group which consist partly of U.S and EU have endorsed ASEAN’s diplomatic lead on the Cambodian crisis. The FOC then undertook special efforts to structure their sanction packages to pressure Cambodia’s Hun Sen on accepting ASEAN’s terms of conditions. Consequently, ASEAN and FOC managed to restore peace in Cambodia. ASEAN can leverage on the success of this highly relatable historical precedent to convince both U.S and EU into coordinating their sanctions in a way that exerts pressures on the Burmese junta towards conforming ASEAN’s 5-point consensus. Moreover, U.S and EU are full dialogue partners, ASEAN can utilize regional forums and special summits to engage both parties on this matter. As a stable southeast Asia is within the interest of U.S and EU, ASEAN’s chances to succeed in establishing deeper coordination with U.S and EU on the Myanmar issue should not be underestimated.
Room for Collaboration between ASEAN and ‘Reluctant’ Dialogue Partners
The international response towards the Myanmar crisis varies widely. While some states primarily the U.S and EU adopts a hard-lined approach in sanctioning the junta regime, other states differ in their response.
Australia and Japan have openly condemned the extrajudicial killings in Myanmar. Japan and Australia also froze new developmental aid and suspended bilateral defences cooperation respectively. However, both countries were hesitant towards increasing pressures on Myanmar and joining the U.S and EU in imposing targeted sanctions against entities linked to the Burmese junta. Dr Daisuke Akimoto from the Institute for Security and Development Policy argued that the reluctance of Canberra and Tokyo can be attributed to geopolitical reasons. Strong sanctions will likely thrust Myanmar further towards the Sino-Russo sphere. Despite Australia and Japan’s reluctance to further impose punitive pressures on the Burmese junta towards making progress on the 5-point consensus, there is still room for ASEAN to work with Canberra and Tokyo on the Myanmar issue.
One of the core areas which the 5-point consensus stipulates is the provision of humanitarian aid. Given the hefty list of humanitarian crisis to deal with, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) is overstretched. AHA is unlikely to have sufficient resources to address the escalating violence in Myanmar. Given Japan and Australia strong support towards ASEAN’s emphasis on the importance of humanitarian aid in resolving the crisis, ASEAN should work with both countries to further strengthen AHA’s capacity or set up new collaborative channels that provide humanitarian aid to Myanmar. Once there is a diplomatic breakthrough that allows inflow of humanitarian aid into Myanmar, the concerned parties will be better prepared to deal with the humanitarian urgency.