The missionaries learned their language and brought education, health care service, and Christianity. This made the indigenous Papuans living in Central Papua’s remote mountainous region felt more appreciated. However, integration with Indonesia brought fundamental changes. Military operations in the 1970s disrupted the peaceful relations and engendered a cycle of violence. This subsequently created a memoria passionis, a collective memory of the history of suffering and violence experienced by indigenous Papuans. Development in Papua is not something new. The indigenous people have long been aware that change is inevitable and the world continues to move forward.
However, what they want is a model of development where they are the subject, meaning that the various development policies must be geared towards respecting their presence and be aligned with their best interests. In reality, Government development policies have tended to treat the native population as mere objects, resulting in them feeling isolated, displaced and marginalized. No wonder they start asking the question: who is all this development for? Make no mistake, they need and want development, but it should be a type where they themselves take center stage. One of the goals stated in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020-2024 － courting investment for the development of Papua will be contradictory if it is not accompanied by a policy aimed at protecting their ancestral lands.
The next question is, will the implementation of the amendment of the Special Autonomy Law in 2021 improve or exacerbate difficulties in achieving its stated goals? Passed on July 15, 2021, the law appears to further demonstrate that the special autonomy is part of Jakarta’s strategy to control Papua. The Government ignored civil society groups’ appeal to have the legal revision be discussed first in Papua, in accordance with Article 77 of Law 21/2021. Meanwhile, civil society organizations and prominent community figures who voiced their disagreement were stigmatized as “rebels”. Protests were swiftly dispersed and activists, both in Papua and Jakarta, were detained.
The amendments include Article 34, in which the Government increases the size of the special autonomy funds from 2 to 2.25 percent of the General Allocation Fund (DAU): 1 percent to be given in full, and 1.25 percent to be based on performance. Presidential Instruction 9/2020 requires different ministries/agencies in Papua and West Papua to utilize special autonomy funds for the acceleration of social welfare development, establishment of a special agency and creation of new administrative polities. Because the funds are quite dispersed, they have enjoyed a smaller trickle-down effect than expected. By the same token, the authority vested in the provincial and regency/municipality governments with regard to management of funds has been reduced. Article 34(10) gives the central government the authority to distribute special autonomy funds to provinces and regencies/municipalities. Even though this was crafted on the advice of the provincial administrations in Papua, in reality the central government has the final say whether to accept the proposal or to continue implementing development plans designed by Jakarta.
Article 28(1&2) which reads (1) The population of Papua Province shall be entitled to form political parties; and (2) The procedure for the formation of the political parties and the participation in the General Election shall be in accordance with statutory regulations were revoked. Despite the clause stating that Papuan natives must be given priority in political recruitment by political parties in the province remains, the law goes on to explain that “the priority given to Papua natives in political recruitment shall not reduce the nature of political parties that is open for every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia.” Also, the requirement that “political parties shall ask for consideration from the MRP in the selection and recruitment of the respective political parties” does not mean that political parties lose their independence in terms of political selection and recruitment.
There is an amendment to Article 68A, with regard to the establishment of a special agency that answers directly to the President. It is headed by the Vice President, with members comprising the Home Minister, National Development Planning Minister, and Finance Minister. It also includes representatives from every province in Papua. The secretariat is based in Papua. The bureaucracy becomes slow, complicated and inefficient. There is also concern that the body might be used as an arena where Papuan elites jostle for power and influence.
Next, an amendment to Article 75(3) states that Perdasus (special bylaws) and Perdasi (provincial bylaws) as the implementing regulations for the law must be made no later than one year after the law is gazetted. Otherwise, the Government can take over its implementation. This gives the central government ever greater authority, especially since consultative relationships with provincial governments are dominated by Jakarta.
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Article 76 on the formation of new administrative polities now stipulates that the central government and the House of Representatives (DPR) can carve out new provinces, municipalities and regencies without the approval of the MRP or regional legislative councils (DPRP). In the previous law, the creation of new administrative polities required green-lighting from both institutions. Even the Government and the House can do this without having to go through the regional preparatory stages, as stipulated in the bylaw; only approval from the Home Ministry is required.
During the revision process, the law received support from indigenous Papuans, which demonstrated the importance of delegating more authority to Papua. However, after the law was passed, it became clear that the spirit of the Special Autonomy Law has been increasingly diminished. Most authority was transferred to the central government, through the enactment of various government regulations, a special agency, administrative proliferation and control over special autonomy funds. The amendment shows that the central government has become increasingly distrustful of the provincial governments and Papuan people.
Grassroots aspirations are ignored, because it is feared that they can undermine the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. The amendment of the Special Autonomy Law turned into another top-down policy imposition as when the original law was formulated in 2000. The silencing of those who reject the law has engendered disappointment and anger among the native population. This is believed to be the one of the triggers of the ongoing violent conflict which has become rampant. To resolve human rights violations and implement non-discriminatory regulations in Papua, the revision of the Special Autonomy Law should have served as the momentum for the Government to understand Papua as a whole. However, the central government missed this valuable opportunity. Instead, it was used as a strategy to weaken the independence and resilience of our native Papuan population.