According to the Institute for Public Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), the intensity of gunfights between security forces (TNI/Polri) and the National Liberation Army of West Papua (TPNPB) actually increased in the period from 2017 to 2021, resulting in the deaths of 125 civilians, 52 security personnel and 34 armed criminal group (KKB) members. Other data collected from the Human Rights Monitor (HRM) also corroborated how human rights violations and political violence still exist in Papua. HRM estimates that the number of internally-displaced people in Papua is estimated to be around 60,000, the majority of them from Nduga, Intan Jaya, Puncak, Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, and Maybrat regencies. While largely underexposed in the national media, these figures indicate that there is an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Papua.
One year ago, in February 2023 to be exact, Philipis Marthen, a New Zealand-born pilot who flew for Susi Air, was kidnapped by TPNPB rebels when he landed in Paro district, Nduga. He is still being held hostage, and there has been a lack of progress in the efforts to free him through negotiation, despite the involvement of a host of parties, from local church leaders, prominent tribal figures, and NGOs.
The Government’s endeavor to bring peace to Papua through development and welfare improvement programs though the massive Rp1,000 trillion funds since 2002, has yet to achieve its intended goal of prosperity for indigenous Papuans. In addition to granting Papua special autonomy status, the Government has also enacted a number of development acceleration policies, such as through Presidential Instruction 5/2007 and Presidential Decree 65/2011 on the acceleration of development in Papua and West Papua and Presidential Decree 66/2011 on the establishment of Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B), Presidential Instructions 9/2017 and 9/2020 on the acceleration of welfare development in Papua and West Papua, Presidential Decree 17/2019 on government procurement for indigenous Papuan entrepreneurs, Presidential Regulation 24/2023 on Papua and West Papua Development Master Plan 2022-2041, Law 2/2021 which amended Law 21/2021 on special autonomy for Papua, and Laws 14, 15 & 16/2022 and 29/2022 on administrative unit proliferation in Papua.
The next question is why special autonomy, which entails various policies to accelerate development and a staggering amount of funds, has still not succeeded in bringing peace to Papua? Several analyses attempt to explain this. According to McGibbon (2006), the Government’s commitment to implementing the Special Autonomy Law weakened after the abrupt resignation of President Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid. Subsequently, the opponents of Papuan special autonomy in successive administrations gained strength, believing that it would only pave way to eventual Papuan independence. This resulted in the enactment of a raft of policies that in effect weakened special autonomy, including creation of West Irian Jaya province in 2003 and the delayed establishment of the Papuan People’s Council.
The failure to implement special autonomy in Papua and its various accompanying policies is not surprising, given that Law 21/2001, which amended Law 2/2021 on special autonomy for Papua, is the same as Law 18/2001 on special autonomy for the special region of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. These two models of autonomy were not agreed upon by the parties to the conflict, especially the Free Papua Organization (OPM) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). These two pieces of legislation were passed unilaterally by the Government and the House, without sufficiently comprehensive dialogue with pro-independence groups. As a consequence, they do not bind the parties to the conflict, and there is no political commitment to do it otherwise. The implementation of “special autonomy” in Papua is therefore the same as that of special autonomy in Aceh before the Helsinki peace accord. Understandably, it will not achieve the desired result. No matter how perfect the laws and government policies for Papua are, if they are made without dialogue with the separatist groups that advocate for Papuan independence, they will be in vain and have a tendency to become a strategy or instrument to control Papua. They will never be able to reduce Papuans’ distrust toward Jakarta and will fail to improve the welfare of the Papuan people and protect the basic rights of indigenous communities, as the special autonomy for Papua was originally envisioned to do.
Apart from the political dimension, the development policies in Papua have also tended to ignore the cultural dimension. After the fall of the autocratic New Order regime, they government enacted Law 21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua. But unfortunately, it failed to change the basic pattern of development previously implemented by the Soeharto administration. It has yet to address the needs of indigenous Papuans. In 2017, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) formulated development plans based on seven customary aspects, but to date this has not been followed by real programs that truly empower the indigenous communities, due to a development model that tends to be driven by capitalism, which has subsequently led to deculturation and reculturation of Papua, otherwise known as “ethnocide”.
Policymakers can actually learn culture-based development from the cultural practices of indigenous peoples who still live in the mountains. Unfortunately, this concept has not been adopted, and as a result, the indigenous Papuans feel that they have been excluded from the development process, especially in urban areas. They sold their land and lived in places that are further away from urban areas. Furthermore, development has also changed the indigenous people’s lifestyle, where they have become increasingly consumer-oriented, as a result of the availability of village aid funds.
Development in Papua has two faces. On the one hand, there is physical progress, such as the construction of roads, ports and impressive infrastructure, but on the other hand, there is marginalization of indigenous Papuans from their own land. Since the 1980s, every time the Government has completed building a road project, it is the migrants from other parts of Indonesia who come to do business in the surrounding area. Development models such as the trans-Papua road create a paradox for the native communities. On the one hand, it makes it easier for them to overcome geographic isolation and access modern amenities, but on the other hand, the road tends to benefit only the migrant communities.
Development in Papua has also created a lingering issue, that of customary land ownership, particularly compensation for ancestral lands acquired for infrastructure projects, transmigration and mining. This tends to result in the marginalization and inequality on the part of the native population, especially in transmigration and urban areas. To avoid this, the Government should pay more heed to a culture-based development paradigm, one which seeks to create more balanced and sustainable development.
Development strategies should be adapted down to conform to the cultural identity of each ethnic group. It is also worth noting that the indigenous community is not a monolith, but rather consists of more than 253 distinct ethnic groups. Another aspect that can be used to view the ethnic diversity is geography, namely, people who inhabit the coasts, swamps, valleys and mountains. Development goals for communities who live in the mountains may be different from those living in coastal areas. Those who live in the mountains may not have much interaction with the outside world for an extended period of time. Their first contact was with the European missionaries who went on to live among them.