Furthermore, there are significant structural and strategic challenges in the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,” such as India’s denial of the negotiating framework, ASEAN nations’ pragmatic principle and the “take one step at a time” approach, and the United States’ strong “trade skepticism.” The question of power, the wrong legal status of the final document, and so on. To overcome the aforementioned hurdles and address many seemingly intractable problems, the US must provide highly appealing terms so that the related discussions may proceed easily. In fact, the majority of participants did not shy away from the subject, publicly stating that they would want to see what the US could “get out of the gourd.”
At the moment, it is highly improbable that the US will invest real money to promote the follow-up discussions, so it is more likely to encourage and even compel other countries to collaborate with the US by inciting new trade and economic issues with China. The United States’ stinginess in commercial and trade cooperation and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region contrasts sharply with its “generous” military aid to Ukraine.
The United States is unwilling to invest in the Asia-Pacific region’s peace, stability, tranquillity, and development. That is exactly what the United States has done. In this framework, the “benefits” that the US delivers to front-line players (as many Southeast Asian countries expect) should be severely restricted.
What has cheaper costs, faster outcomes, and higher “lethality” for the United States is to enhance the intensity and tension of Sino-US economic and trade frictions, enlarge “little courtyards,” and create up “high walls,” putting pressure on Sino-US rivalry. It is distributed to participants in the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” and “urges” all parties to voice their views and even “choose sides.”